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Abstract
The Covid-19 health crisis has led to a substantial increase in work done
from home, which shifts economic activity across geographic space. We re-
fer to this shift as a Zoomshock. The Zoomshock has implications for locally
consumed services; much of the clientèle of restaurants, coffee bars, pubs,
hair stylists, health clubs, and the like located near workplaces is trans-
ferred to establishments located near where people live. In this paper we
measure the Zoomshock at a very granular level for UK neighbourhoods.
We establish three important empirical facts. First, the Zoomshock is large;
many workers can work-from-home and live in a different neighbourhood
than they work. Second, the Zoomshock is very heterogeneous; economic
activity is decreasing in productive city centres and increasing residential
suburbs. Third, the Zoomshock moves workers away from neighbour-
hoods with a large supply of locally consumed services to neighbourhoods
where the supply of these services is relatively scarce. We discuss the impli-
cations for aggregate employment and local economic recovery following
the Covid-19 health crisis.
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1 Introduction
A defining feature of modern life is the office. And the concentration of offices
in city centres and business parks has meant commuting is a fact of life for
many workers. As the lot of a commuter is to spend much of their time away
from home, their consumption reflects that. Workers buy sandwiches for lunch,
coffee during breaks, and after-work drinks. They also visit retail shops near
their offices, have their hair cut between meetings, visit gyms before work, they
use taxis, have their car serviced while they are in the office, and so on. These
are all examples of locally consumed services (LCS): these are services defined
by necessarily being supplied and demanded in a given place.
The Covid-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented shift in the fraction of
work that is done from home versus the office. This geographic shift in pro-
ductive activities, which we refer to as the Zoomshock, moves work and workers
from their offices in high density urban areas to comparatively low density resi-
dential neighbourhoods. This has had important consequences for providers of
LCS. Establishments previously patronised by commuters are suffering, while
neighbourhood establishments have seen a surge in demand from homework-
ers.
This paper has two objectives. First, we propose an empirical measure of
the Zoomshock. This metric reflects the change in of work activities (measured
as the number of employees or total income) for a given neighbourhood. It
weights the difference between workers who work and live in a given neigh-
bourhoods by their ability to work-from-home. We use this method to estimate
Zoomshocks for each neighbourhood in England, Scotland and Wales. A clear
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pattern emerges: the Covid-19 Zoomshock has moved productive activity away
from formerly highly output city centres into residential areas.
Second, we examine the consequences of the Zoomshock for LCS in the af-
fected neighbourhoods and employment in the larger industry. In the short to
medium-run the Zoomshock creates a geographic supply-demand mismatch;
there are many LCS businesses in city centres but relatively few in the residen-
tial suburbs. Even when we allow for perfect mobility of labour, the fact that
capital is slow to move, and the lack of density in the suburbs, means that LCS
employment will fall below its pre-Covid-19 level.
We believe that the concept of Zoomshock will prove useful for deigning
policy that seeks to minimise the economic damage caused by the Covid-19
pandemic, and to use scarce resources devoted to economic recovery as effi-
ciently as possible. Although preliminary, several implications are clear from
our analysis. First, at the local level there is very significant geographic hetero-
geneity within urban areas in how working from home will impact LCS busi-
nesses. Any recovery assistance policy should reflect this heterogeneity and fo-
cus resources on firms and workers in neighbourhoods who have experienced
a negative Zoomshock. Second, the aggregate consequences across neighbour-
hoods of the Zoomshock will be in larger in some areas. Local authorities where
the skewness of the neighbourhood-level Zoomshock distribution is greater are
likely to suffer a greater employment loss in the LCS industry. Finally, it is criti-
cal that we understand better the long-run consequences of the Zoomshock. The
efficient policy prescription will depend crucially on how many former com-
muters continue to work-from-home once the Covid-19 pandemic subsides. If
the switch to working-from-home is permanent for at least some of the work-
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ers, for at least some of the time, it may portend long-lasting changes in the
productive structure of localised areas: 50% of the commuters to an area switch
to working-from-home for two days per week is a 20% loss in potential demand
for the area LCS. In the long term, establishments providing LCS may drift from
the high streets to the suburbs.
It should be stressed that we do not attempt to fully capture the effect of the
Covid-19 pandemic on the LCS industry. This industry has been hit particu-
larity hard by social distancing measures, and will undoubtedly be negatively
impacted if the broader economy struggles to recover following the pandemic.
Here we abstract from these effects of the pandemic, both for LCS and the
broader labour market, and focus on how homeworking specifically will impact
these businesses. These consequences, and the implications for recovery policy,
are have not yet been studied but the potential implications of working-from-
home for the recovery of employment and output in the wake of the Covid-19
pandemic are, as we will see, of first-order importance.
This paper complements empirical studies that look at the regional geogra-
phy of economic risks arising from the Covid-19 pandemic (Davenport et al.,
2020). We emphasise the importance of working with relatively small areas:
in theory, and as we will empirically demonstrate, a small local area may be
severely affected by the Zoomshock while neighbouring areas potentially bene-
fit from the shock. Zoomshocks are also very complex: they depend on (i) com-
muting patterns: these are highly asymmetric, most commuters travel from
“residential areas” in cities, the suburbs, or the countryside to work in city-
centres; (ii) the ability of commuters to work remotely: office workers with little
contact with customers can work-from-home easily, vets and events managers
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with greater difficulty if at all; (iii) commuters’ demand for LCS: this in turn
depends on both the commuters’ income and the fraction they spend on LCS—
expensive wine bars are LCS, but home delivery of cases of fine wine is not, and
how much of the LCS are consumed at work— the services supplied by garden-
ers and nannies are by their nature not consumed at the work location. (iv) and
finally on the ability of supply to adjust to increased demand: a community
with many home-working residents may find that some continue to demand
similar LCS as when they commuted, e.g. they may still prefer to buy their
lunch, rather than prepering it themselves. But existing businesses might be
unable to increase their supply to satisfy this demand.
This paper contributes to an emerging evidence base on the costs, in labour
market terms, of stay at home orders. Baek et al. (Forthcoming), provides evi-
dence that stay at home account for less than a quarter of total Covid related job
losses in the US. But this impact has been uneven. Crossley et al. (2021), using
panel data for the UK, find that the impacts of the pandemic have been most
pronounced for those on the lowest incomes, and those from minority ethnic
groups. Mongey and Weinberg (2020) find similar results for the US. Angelucci
et al. (2020) also find that health losses are disproportionately concentrated on
these groups. Barrero et al. (2020) suggest that 42% of jobs lost due to Covid in
the US will be permanent.
It also contributes to a second strand of the post-Covid literature whose fo-
cus is on which, and how many, jobs can be done from home. Dingel and
Neiman (2020) provided early U.S. and international evidence. Alipour et al.
(2020) provide similar evidence for Germany. In this paper we add to this liter-
ature by proposing a classification for the UK, and mapping occupation and
4
wage heterogeity in ability to work-from-home to geographic heterogeneity.
Gottlieb et al. (2020) study what share of jobs are tele-workable across coun-
tries, documenting that fewer jobs are tele-workable in lower income countries,
in part due to the higher share and nature of self-employment in those coun-
tries.
Others have documented the impact on consumption patterns (Baker et al.,
2020; Barrero et al., 2020; Chronopoulos et al., 2020). To our knowledge there
has been little attention to the spatial aspects of these changes.
This is one of the few papers to consider the spatial aspects of working-
from-home. In contemporaneous work Delventhal and Parkhomenko (2020)
provide a quantitative model for Los Angeles to study how in the long-run
teleworking may affect the spatial distribution of jobs and residents. In another
contemporaneous contribution Delventhal et al. (2020) introduce a quantitative
spatial equilibrium model in which workers are heterogeneous in the amount
of time they work “on site”. Their model predicts a non-monotonic impact of
teleworking—increasing activity in the most productive cities while also in the
lowest density areas.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we specify how we measure the
Zoomshock, characterising it by geographic shifts in workers and geographic
shifts in GDP. In Section 3 we discuss the data which we use in our primary
analysis: this comes from the UK Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. In
Section 4 we use these measures to examine the Zoomshock across Britain, and
how working-from-home has changed the geography of productive activities.
In Section 5 we discuss, and provide some theoretical basis for, the impact that
working from home has on the LCS industry at highly localised levels and on
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aggregate LCS employment. We conclude with some discussion of the out-
standing information needed and implications for short and longer-term policy.
2 The Zoomshock
We use the term Zoomshock to describe the geographic change in economic ac-
tivity due to the shift towards working-from-home during the Covid-19 pan-
demic. Here we present metrics that can be calculated using existing data and
capture the differences in the sign and magnitude of the Zoomshock in different
neighbourhoods. We consider two different ways of thinking about a change in
economic activity. The first is by looking at the geographic change in the num-
ber of workers (which will be the focus of our empirical analysis). The second
is by looking at the geographic change in GDP, measured as the income of these
worker.
Consider first the change in the number of workers within a geographically
defined zone, z. This change can be estimated by considering three character-
istics: 1) the number of workers who work in z; 2) the number of workers who
live in z; 3) and whether the jobs performed by these workers can be done at
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where the weighting of the count is given by the measure of the ability to per-
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form their work at home. This is the difference between the number of workers
who are able to leave zone z to work from their home located in zone z′ 6= z,
and the number of individuals who are resident in zone z and are able to work
from home instead of having to go in person to zone z′′ 6= z.
Formally, (1) can be calculated for each zone z as follows:
ζz = ∑
i
HD′i (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z]) , (2)
where 1[·] ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function. 1[residencei = z] equals 1 if indi-
vidual i lives in zone z, and 0 otherwise; 1[worki = z] equals 1 if individual i
works in zone z, and 0 otherwise. H and Di are vectors of occupation-specific
work-from-home indices and individual i’s occupation, respectively.
The product HD′i ∈ [0, 1] is worker i’s work-from-home index, with which
we weight each observation. We adapt the home-working classification of Din-
gel and Neiman (2020) for each of our 380 four-digit UK Standardised Occu-
pation Codes, with minor adjustments required to map US job descriptions
to the UK ones. Formally, given a set of occupations o = 1, . . . , 380, H =
(h1, h2, ..., h380) ∈ [0, 1]
380 is a vector of occupation-specific indices for which
an element ho ∈ [0, 1] reflects the feasibility of performing the duties required
by occupation o in a location other than “work”. A delivery driver will gener-
ally have a home-working index of ho = 0, an IT software consultant will have
an index of ho = 1. Other workers may have an intermediate value, as they
can perform some tasks remotely, but some require their physical presence.1
1As examples of occupations with an index of 0.5, forklift truck drivers, artists, and credit
controllers are among them. For security guards, the index is 13 , for estate agents
3
4 , and for
garage managers and proprietors 89 : of the 380 4-digit occupation classified by the ONS, 162 are
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Di ∈ {0, 1}
380 is a vector of occupation dummies for individual i’s main job,
that is a vector whose o-th element is 1 if and only if occupation o is individual
i’s main job.
Our resulting work-from-home index matches well with data reflecting ac-
tual working from home (see Appendix B for analysis). We also find that work-
ers who can work from home are paid more (this corresponds to Aum et al.
(2020) for the US): controlling for industry, year, age, hours worked, gender,
and region of residence, a worker who can work from home is paid over 40%
more that one who cannot.
Expression (2) has a number of properties worth pointing out. First, occu-
pations which cannot be done at home, such as those in the LCS industry, will
not change the values of ζz; occupations for which ho = 0 carry no weight. Sec-
ond, ζz reflects the economic activity of those who commute in or out of zone
z; individuals who work and live in the same zone will not affect (2). Third, ζz
aggregates to higher levels of geographic space. For any geographic area made






HD′i (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z]) . (3)
When areas or zones vary considerably in population, as is the case with British
local authorities, it will prove convenient, for the sake of comparison, to work
also with a per capita Zoomshock: this is obtained by dividing the RHS of Ex-
classified as not suitable for home-working, 124 as partly suitable, and 94 as fully suitable. We
provide a descriptive analysis of our resulting work-from-home index in Appendix B.
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i (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z])
∑z∈A ∑i 1[worki = z]
× 100. (4)
Expression (4) is percentage change in employment activities in area A. ζ̂A can
also be calculated for a specific zone, z, as a special case where A = {z}.
The above expressions look at the change in the number of workers across
geography due to a shift to working from home. It is also useful to measure
changes in economic activity in terms of the change in the value of output pro-
duced in a specific area. To do this we weight equations (3) and (4) by income
for each individual i, which we denote by yi.














iyi (1[residencei = z]− 1[worki = z])
∑z∈A ∑i 1[worki = z]
× 100. (6)
2A substantial recent literature has studied the efficiency of working from home. Bloom et al.
(2015) provide evidence from a within-firm RCT that homeworking increases the productivity
of call-centre workers by up to 22%. Mas and Pallais (2017) find that the average call-centre
worker is willing to pay 8% to work from home. Although, Battiston et al. (Forthcoming) pro-
vides evidence that face-to-face communication improves productivity. One reading of these
somewhat contradictory results is that the optimum level of working-from-home is some mix
of office- and elsewhere-based work. Here, we assume there is no aggregate impact on the
productivity of those working-from-home. We also abstract from other consequences of work
flexibility (Kelly et al., 2014; Allen et al., 2015; Beckmann et al., 2017; Felstead and Henseke,
2017; Spreitzer et al., 2017; Chan, 2018; Ameriks et al., 2020).
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3 Data
We calculate the expressions on the RHS of (2) and (3) using information from
the secure version of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). The ASHE
contains a random 1% sample of all employees in England, Wales, and Scot-
land.3 In addition to detailed occupation and earnings information, we also
observe the precise geographic location of employment and residence for each
individual in our data. We construct pre-Covid-19 employment distributions
using the 2017, 2018 and 2019 waves of the data. This provides us with obser-
vations on approximately 200, 000 workers.
We conduct our analysis at the level of the Middle Super Output Area (MSOA)
for England and Wales and Intermediate Zone for Scotland (for brevity we refer
simply to MSOA hereafter). These are areas of roughly the same residential
population size (the mean population is around 9000 people).4 We also con-
sider a second, coarser, geographical partition, the Lower Tier Local Authority
(LAD).5 These are administrative and political units, and vary substantially in
size. The largest, Birmingham has a population of over 1 million while the Isles
of Scilly a population of just over 2, 000.
Only 11% of UK workers have the home and the work address in the same
MSOA, and there is considerable variation in this proportion across the coun-
3Unfortunately, data for the ASHE, required for our analysis, is not available for Northern
Ireland.
4In principle it would be possible to work with even finer geographies but MSOAs are pre-
ferred since they are large enough that they will in general represent a local community with
some shops, etc., rather than just a collection of houses. Smaller areas would also ask too much
of the data.
5Specifically, we analyse the Local Authority Districts in England, the Council Areas in Scot-
land, and the Principal Areas in Wales.
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Figure 1:
Commuters by MSOA and Local Authority
Note: The horizontal axis is the percent of residents who work outside of the MSOA
(left) and LAD (right) in which they live.
Data source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of
Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
try. In Figure 1 we show the distribution, across all MSOAs, in the proportion
of workers who live and work in different MSOAs (i.e. commuters). Clearly,
the role of commuting is a significant; in over 97% of MSOAs more than 60% of
residents commute for work (Figure 1, left panel). One naturally expects that
the proportion of commuters will decrease as the area we look at is larger, but
the proportion of commuters remains significant when we look at local author-
ities: around 50% of workers commute to a different local authority than that
in which they live (Figure 1, right panel). Moreover, there is considerable varia-
11
Figure 2:
Residents and workers who can work-from-home, Bassetlaw
Note: These maps show, for each MSOA, the number of workers who are resident in
each MSOA and can work-from-home (left map), and the number of workers whose
place of work is in the MSOA and can work-from-home (right map).
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
tion: some LADs have over three quarters of their residents working elsewhere,
in others LADs fewer than one in five do so. Thus, commuting even between
large areas is common and varies in extent.
4 Geography of the Zoomshock
As an illustration, we begin our analysis—like so many others—by considering
Bassetlaw. This is a relatively small LAD, 150 miles north of London. There
are 14 MSOAs in Bassetlaw; for each MSOA, we compute the number of em-
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ployed residents who can work from home: this is first term in Equation (1),
and is depicted on the left map of Figure 2. We next compute the corresponding
number of workers whose place of work is in an MSOA in Bassetlaw, but who
can work-from-home in a different MSOA (possibly also in the Bassetlaw local
authority): this is the second term in (2), and is depicted on the right map of
Figure 2. The MSOA known as Bassetlaw 014 (the large dark red region on the
left map of Figure 2) has approximately 1465 workers who live in the MSOA,
but 5661 workers who work in the MSOA. Of the former, we compute that 485
workers can work-from-home, approximately one third. Of the latter, 1,828 can
work-from-home, again just about a third. Therefore, if all workers who can
work from home do so, we expect Bassetlaw 014 to see a net decrease in em-
ployment of approximately 1, 828 − 485 = 1, 343 workers.
The maps in Figure 3 show the corresponding Zoomshock for each of the
MSOAs in the Bassetlaw local authority. The map to the left of this figure illus-
trates the net inflow of homeworking workers (Equation (2)), and reflects the
difference between the left and right maps of Figure 2. Red (blue) areas corre-
spond to MSOAs in which home working results in less (more) economic activ-
ity, that is MSOA z for which (2) is negative (positive). The depth of the shades
of red and blue corresponds to strength of the flow, a deeper shade indicates
a larger flow. Boundary between colour bins are set, for positive and negative
values separately, at Zoomshock values approximately at the 20th, 40th, 60th,
80th and 95th MSOA percentiles for Britain.
The right hand side map of Figure 3 reports the same exercise for Equation
(5), so the Zoomshock reflects changes in the value of economic activity across
MSOAs. This is different way of looking at the geographic shift in economic ac-
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tivity due to home-working, and roughly corresponds to the potential change
in the annual GDP for a area z. Notice that quintile assignments of the two Bas-
setlaw maps in Figure 3 are roughly in agreement with one another, but there
are differences, for example, there are two changes in the sign of the flow: one
MSOA for which the change in the flow of workers is negative (positive), while
the corresponding GDP change is positive (negative). An area with a negative
net-flow of workers (a red shade on the LHS map) and a positive GDP net-flow
(a blue shade on the RHS map) is one where the residents are relatively highly
paid workers, and although those who stop commuting to work from home are
fewer, they are sufficiently better paid on average to more than offset the in-
comes of the larger number of workers who no longer need come into the area
to work. In the maps and analysis that follow, for brevity, we focus primarily on
the Zoomshock in terms of workers, and leave the important analysis of income
flows for future research.
The primary drivers of variation in the Zoomshock are the distribution of
where people live relative to where they work, and the geographic clustering of
work which is potentially suitable for home-working. We illustrate the second
in Figure 4 for the Greater London Authority. The left-hand-side map shows
the geographic distribution of all employment; the right hand side map shows
employment weighted by the home-working index. The comparison between
the two panels makes it clear that jobs suitable for home-working are dispro-
portionately concentrated in the centre of London.
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Figure 3:
Zoomshock by workers and GDP, Bassetlaw
Note: These maps show quantiles of expressions (2) and (5) by MSOA. Quantile bound-
aries are calculated separately for positive and negative shocks to represent the 25th,
50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
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Figure 4:
Employees and employment suitable for working-from-home, Greater London Authority
Note: The maps show the netflow of workers from each area (see the note to Figure 3 for details). On the LHS, each area is
an MSOA, on the RHS a London Borough.
Data source: ONS Business Structure Database , 2018. Proportion of homework by MSOA based on authors calculations
using information from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
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Figure 5:
Geographical differences in suitably of jobs for working-from-home.
Note: The horizontal axis reports the estimated percent of total employment, within an
MSOA, that is suitable for working-from-home.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
Both maps show that neighbouring areas may have widely varying propor-
tion of workers with the ability to work remotely. This is summarised more
generally for the whole of the UK in Figure 5. In some MSOAs more than 60%
of residents can work-from-home, while in many others only fewer than 30%
of residents can work-from-home. The same is true at local authority level. As
we shall see, it is this heterogeneity that gives the Zoomshock its bite. In Fig-
ure (6) we illustrate the Zoomshock for the Greater London Authority, at the
level of the MSOA (ζz from Equation (2)) and aggregated to the local author-
17
ity (ζ̂A from Equation (4)). Both maps confirm the familiar pattern of work-
ers living on the periphery of the metropolis and working in the inner city. If
MSOA Zoomshocks are generated within local authorities, we would expect to
see ζ̂A ≈ 0. These maps demonstrate that this is not the case, workers in central
London are commuting from beyond the local authority.6
6The deep-red colouring of some areas on the western border of London also reflects this.
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Figure 6:
Zoomshock, Greater London Authority
Note: These maps show quantiles of expressions (2) and (3) by MSOA (left) and local authority (right). Quantile boundaries
are calculated separately for positive and negative shocks to represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great
Britain in the left-hand side map and the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain in the right-hand side map.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
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These maps illustrate the importance of a very granular view: there are
sharp, often extreme, differences among neighbouring areas. These differences
are lost when a coarse partition is chosen. The map on the LHS in Figure 6
shows a more fragmented distribution, indicating that there are substantial vari-
ations within boroughs. This can be seen in more detail in the close up of the
London boroughs of Hackney and Kensington and Chelsea that we show in
Figures 7a and 7b. Even though Hackney as a whole is an area of net inflow
(more people are returning than are leaving), there are pockets with a large net
outflow (those in pink and deep red in the map). The picture is similar, if with
the reverse signs, for Kensington and Chelsea; patterns of deep red neighbour
areas of blue.
This is not just a London (or Bassetlaw) phenomenon. We also report the
Zoomshocks for (the nine local authorities of) Greater Birmingham and Soli-
hull, for (the ten local authorities in) Greater Manchester, and for (the four local
authorities in) the Sheffield City Region: these are Figures 8-10. Again these
highlight the highly asymmetric pattern of commuting from where people live
to where people work: some areas predominantly serve as residences, others are
mainly places for work. In the Appendix to this paper , we provide Zoomshock
maps for a wide variety of LADs and counties across England, Wales and Scot-
land.
In Figure 11, we map ζ̂A by local authorities for the the whole of Great Britain
(omitting the Shetland and Orkney Islands). A couple of interesting features are
worth point out. First, the majority of the areas on the map are blue, suggesting
a positive Zoomshock. This is unsurprising, as pre-home-working economic
activity tends to concentrate in few, relatively dense, geographic areas. Second,
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Figure 7:
Zoomshock, Hackney and Kensington & Chelsea
(a) Hackney (b) Kensington and Chelsea
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
larger (in terms of area) local authorities appear to be more likely to have posi-
tive Zoomshocks, while small local authorities are more likely to have negative
Zoomshocks. This reflects an important feature of the Zoomshock, economic ac-
tivity is flowing to less-densely populated parts of Britain. These features both
suggest that working-from-home is leading to economic activity being signifi-
cantly less geographically concentrated.
In Table 1 we list the ten local authorities with the largest negative and pos-
itive Zoomshocks. The top of the list of negative shocks is perhaps somewhat
21
Figure 8:
Zoomshock, Greater Birmingham and Solihul
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
predictable, as six of the top ten are in Central London. However, other local
authorities, such as Nottingham and Newcastle are perhaps a little more sur-
prising. The magnitude of the Zoomshocks are substantial—three-quarters of
workers in the City of London and half of those in Westminster can work-from-
home. The boroughs with the largest positive shocks are again predominantly





Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
Another interesting feature of the data is the differences in the GDP shock.
East Dunbartonshire has a larger increase in the number of workers than East
Renfrewshire, but the implied increase in GDP is only around one third of the
size. This emphasises that not only is there important heterogeneity in the num-
bers of workers in an MSOA able to work-from-home but there is also substan-
tial variation in how much they earn and likely spend. This is important as it
suggests that there may be a reversal of fortune, the most prosperous areas, like
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Figure 10:
Zoomshock, Sheffield City Region
Note: This map shows quantiles of Expression (2) by local authority. Quantiles bound-
aries represent the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles for Great Britain, calculated
separately for positive and negative shocks.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
the City of London, previously characterised by large numbers of highly paid
commuters are the places most affected. One thing this highlights is that the
places that might be most affected are those where, even if fewer in number,
commuters account for a large share of GDP.
5 The Zoomshock and LCS workers
The analysis so far illustrates the considerable variability of the Zoomshock
across MSOAs. In this section we analyse the implications of this variation for
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Figure 11:
Zoomshock, Great Britain local authorities
Note: The maps show the netflow of workers from each MSOA (Equation (2), see the
note to Figure 3 for details).
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
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Table 1:
Largest negative and positive Zoomshock by local authority





City of London -75.6 -2,592,970
Westminster -49.9 -1,218,470
Camden -43.1 -648,598











Waltham Forest 60.3 1,156,035
East Dunbartonshire 57.4 384,360





Calculations correspond to expressions (4) and (6).
†GDP shown as pounds per annum.
Data source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the ONS Annual Survey
of Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019.
the LCS sector. The key point is that while the Zoomshock is itself additive
across zones—as can be seen from expressions (3) and (5)—the consequences of
the Zoomshock for area employment in the LCS industry are almost certainly
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not additive. This is because the presence of frictions, such as imperfect labour
mobility and capacity constraints, means that a movement in LCS demand from
one zone to another will not, in the short- and medium-run, be perfectly mir-
rored by a movement in LCS supply.7 As a result, we expect to see a decrease
in aggregate LCS employment, with wages increasing in positive Zoomshock
neighbourhoods.
A complete formal analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, instead in
this section we present an intuitive graphical analysis of the short-medium run
effects of the Zoomshock on the distribution of LCS employment and economic
activity. We show that the aggregate impact on LCS employment in a LAD
depends crucially on the shape of the distribution, and specifically the skewness
of positive MSOA Zoomshocks.
To this end, Figure 12 depicts the demand and the supply for LCS work-
ers in zone z in the pre-Zoomshock equilibrium, given by (L∗z , w
∗
z ), where Lz
is the number of LCS workers and wz is the wage. To simplify the analysis we
make the assumption that all the demand for LCS workers comes from non-LCS
workers. This strong assumption is only to aid calculations and carve in sharper
relief the distinction between the two groups of workers.8 The pre-Zoomshock
intersection of demand and supply in zone z reflects a long-run spatial equi-
librium. This is reflected by the shape of the supply function, depicted as the
dashed curve where LCS workers are in their preferred job and residence. From
7To focus on the effect of the geographic change in where work is done, we assume that LCS
demand from workers is independent of whether they work from home or the office. This is
likely an overly-optimistic assumption. For example, having access to a one’s own kitchen may
decrease demand for restaurant food when one works at home relative to the office.
8Thus, a barber (who is a LCS worker) may have lunch in a local restaurant, and if he stops
working, due to the fact that many of his customers are teleworking, the restaurant will lose the
barber’s custom as well, amplifying the effect of the non-LCS worker remote working.
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Figure 12:




Note: This figure illustrates the market for LCS workers in a zone z. The downward
sloping curve shows demand for workers (Lz) at each wage (wz). The dashed and solid
upward sloping curves depict two possible supply curves for z.
this equilibrium in order to attract new LCS workers, businesses in zone z will
need to pay progressively higher salaries. Initially, the increase might only need
to be small to attract workers close to indifferent between their current zone and
zone z, but then larger increases will be needed to persuade others to move to
or to commute to zone z. The shape of the supply function, in particular the
“steepness” of the curve beyond the initial equilibrium, depends on the charac-
teristics of zone z, such as the geographical proximity and type of neighbouring
zones. As an example, in a sparsely populated zone an LCS business may find
that larger wage increases are necessary to attract additional staff, who would
have to travel substantial distances to work.9
The aggregate effect of the Zoomshock on LCS employment for a LAD de-
pends on the distribution of the shock across the MSOAs that make up the LAD.
9The steepness of the curve will depend on the willingness of unemployed LCS workers to
commute as well as on capacity-constraints, etc. Marinescu and Rathelot (2018) show that in
the US job-seekers are a around third less likely to apply to a job 10 miles away.
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Figure 13:










Note: This figure illustrates possible Zoomshocks for eight zones across two fictional
areas.
In Figure 13 we illustrate this for two fictional LADs, Loamshire and Wessex,
each containing four MSOAs, one in each quadrant of the LAD. To highlight
the aspects that affect the link between the overall effect of the Zoomshock
and the shape of the distribution of these shocks in the area, we make assump-
tions which are deliberately extreme. The demand function for LCS (black solid
curve) is identical in all eight areas, and so in the long run equilibrium each area
has the same employment for LCS workers who are all paid the same wage. The
eight demand and supply diagrams in Figure 13 depict the LCS market in each
of these MSOAs.
We also posit the supply functions to be the same in the eight zones. This
again is to highlight the role of skewness in the Zoomshock, and could be re-
laxed with no change in the results. What matters is that, beyond the pre-shock
equilibrium the supply is convex; as we argue above, this is plausible. Figure 13
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depicts a large decrease in demand (brought on by a negative Zoomshock) in
the north-east MSOA of each of Loamshire and Wessex. In these zones, half
the workers stop commuting there to work and instead work-from-home. This
is represented by the demand function for LCS workers in these areas shifting
to the red curve, where LCS labour demand at the previous salary, is exactly
half as it was before. What distinguishes Loamshire and Wessex is where the
teleworkers reside. In Loamshire they all live in the north-easterly MSOAs. In
this MSOA the demand curve shifts to that of the blue line: the demand has
increased by 50%, a rightward shift equal in size to the leftward shift of the red
curve in the north-west. In the two other MSOA there is no change, as no one
previously commuted to or from them, so the equilibrium in these two “south-
ern” MSOAs is unaltered. The total employment of LCS workers in Loamshire
changes by the difference between the the decrease in the north-west zone, the
distance between L∗z and A1, and the increase in the north-east zone, the dis-
tance between A2 and L
∗
z . That, is, the total employment in Loamshire following
the Zoomshock is 2L∗z + A1 + A2.
But now consider Wessex: here the workers who were commuting to the
north-west zone and are now teleworking are evenly distributed across the rest
of the LAD, so that in each of the three other MSOAs, the demand curve for LCS
workers shifts by a third of the distance of the shift in the north-east MSOA in
Loamshire, as depicted in the RHS panel of Figure 13. The analogous argu-
ment shows that the post-Zoomshock employment in Wessex is A1 + 3A3. The
convexity of the supply of labour beyond the pre-Zoomshock equilibrium im-
plies that the distance between A2 and L
∗
z is less than three times the distance
between A3 and L
∗
z . This implies that the total loss of employment due to the
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Figure 14:








































Note: This figure illustrates possible Zoomshocks for eight zones across two fictional
areas.
fact that workers cannot relocate frictionlessly between MSOAs is greater in
Loamshire. Thus in the comparison between the two counties, the loss of LCS
employment depends not on the magnitude of the aggregate Zoomshock, but
on the skewness of the distribution of the shocks: Wessex’s distribution is more
skewed than Loamshire’s (which is in fact symmetric).
The next figure shows however that it is only right skweness (that is posi-
tive skewness) that matters. In Midsomer, the shock pattern is symmetric, ex-
actly the same as in Loamshire, whereas the county of Rutshire, has one MSOA
with the same positive shock as Midsomer, the north-west in both counties, but
smaller negative shocks in the three other MSOA, making the shock distribu-
tion in the county left skewed. Yet the overall impact on LCS employment is
the same in Rutshire and in Midsomer, due to the linearity of the supply func-
tion to the left of the pre-shock equilibrium.
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There are already two lessons to take from this preliminary analysis. The
first is that, in aggregate, we expect the Zoomshock will lead to a decrease in
LCS employment. This is a consequence of short-run labour market frictions
and capital availability that mean a shift in LCS demand from one neighbour-
hood to another will not be mirrored by a similar shift supply. The second
lesson is that we expect the consequences for employment across an LAD to be
worse the more skewed is the Zoomshock across the MSOAs which make up
the LAD.
5.1 The Zoomshock and Locally Consumed Services: Some Ev-
idence
There is significant anecdotal evidence of the negative impact that the Covid-
19 pandemic has had on the LCS industry, particularly in urban centres such
as central London. Given the large negative Zoomshock we estimate for central
London (Figure 6), this is not surprising. We now provide quantitative evidence
as to the scale and distribution of this shock. As stated in the introduction, we
define LCS as any good or service for which the market is geographically con-
strained, both supply and demand must take place in a fixed geographic loca-
tion. Restaurants, hairdresser and theatres are obvious examples. Although the
goods purchased in a department store are not part of locally consumed ser-
vices per se, the service provided by the department store, providing an outlet
and assistance in which to purchase goods, is a local service.10 We define busi-
nesses and employees in the locally consumed service industry according to 615
10Our definition of local services is closely related to the tradeable and non-tradeable goods
nomenclature, as in Mian and Sufi (2014).
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four-digit Standardized Industry Classification codes.
The overall distribution is shown in Figure 15. Here we see that, both within
the Greater London Area (left panel) and outside it (right panel), the propor-
tion of MSOAs experiencing a negative shock is increasing with the number of
the local service employees. That is, in our data, LCS employment is concen-
trated in neighbourhoods in which there are many jobs suitable for working-
from-home. The average MSOA which experiences a positive Zoomshock has
687 employees working (pre-Covid-19) in LCS within the MSOA. The aver-
age MSOA experiencing a negative Zoomshock has 2139 employees working
(pre-Covid-19) in LCS within the MSOA. Despite the fact that only 28% of
MSOAs are predicted to experience a negative Zoomshock (1990 MSOAs), these
MSOAs account for 54% of all the local service employment. Overall, in Britain
4,252,963 employees suffer a negative shock, against versus 3,583,376 employ-
ees in MSOAs experiencing a positive shock.
Figure 15 shows that a small number of MSOAs are experiencing very large
Zoomshocks, an increase in employment in some cases of over 300%. These
large changes are concentrated in the MSOAs with the fewest LCS employees.
For most MSOAs experiencing a positive shock this is smaller, reflected by the
mass of points just above the red-dashed horizontal line which separates posi-
tive and negative shocks. This combination implies the distribution of positive
shocks to be characterised by most shocks being small and close to the mode,
with a few large shocks far to the right. That is, right-skewed. Moreover, the
largest shocks have been in MSOAs where the composition of employment sug-
gests there is the least existing capacity. It is reasonable to suspect that this lim-
ited capacity will mean that there will be less ability to absorb these increases.
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Recall from Figure 14, that while the data also show that distribution of nega-
tive shocks is also skewed—this is not what matters for the aggregate outcome.
While, the right-most observations in the left and right panels represent an aver-
age of over 8,000 and 22,000 employees respectively it isn’t the concentration of
these losses, but rather the inability of MSOAs experiencing positive shocks to
re-employ them that leads to the negative aggregate effect on LCS employment.
This is the UK government’s official measure of relative deprivation. It is
based on 39 separate indicators and aims to capture the lack of resources needed
to meet needs across a wide range of an individual’s living conditions, not just
lack of financial resources.
We close our analysis by noting that the losses in LCS employment are likely
to exacerbate geographic inequality. Figure 16 shows that LCS workers are dis-
proportionately likely to live in MSOAs high Index of Multiple Deprivation
scores.11 In the most deprived MSOAs, roughly 45% of residents are employed
in the LCS sector. Thus, the skewness of the negative shock distribution may
not matter for the overall level of LCS employment losses, but to the extent that
workers in MSOAs with the most negative shocks live in similar locations, we
may expect the increase in poverty to be highly geographically concentrated.
This concentration might have important policy implications.
11This is the UK government’s official measure of relative deprivation. It is based on 39 sep-
arate indicators and aims to capture the lack of resources needed to meet needs across a wide
range of an individual’s living conditions, not just lack of financial resources.
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Figure 15:
Zoomshock and local service employment
Note: This figure regresses, for each MSOA, the Zoomshock (Equation 4) against the
log-employment in the local service industry. Binned into 100 evenly sized groups.
Data source: Change in MSOA employment based on authors’ calculation using the
ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2017, 2018, 2019. Log-employment in
local services by MSOA calculated using information from the ONS Business Structure
Database, 2018.
6 Conclusion
This paper looks at an important economic consequence of the Covid-19 pan-
demic. The pandemic has lead to a significant shift in the geographic distribu-
tion of economic activity as workers who can work from home, do so. We refer
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Figure 16:
Index of Multiple Deprivation
Note: Binscatter plot: each of the dots represents many MSOAs, to avoid cluttering the
diagram.
Data source: Percent employment in local services by MSOA calculated using informa-
tion from the ONS Business Structure Database, 2018.
to this redistribution as the Zoomshock.
There are three takeaways from our results. First, the Zoomshock is large—
many people can work form home and many people live in a different neigh-
bourhood from the one where they work. This is true both for specific neigh-
bourhoods and when we aggregate to the level of local authorities. Second,
the Zoomshock is extremely heterogeneous. Within UK local authorities, some
neighbourhoods have experienced a very large decline in economic activity
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while others have seen a surge. In general, while the most prominent fea-
ture of the Zoomshock has been the relocation of economic activity from a few
densely populated city centres to the suburbs, the precise changes are often
quite different in seemingly similar neighbourhoods. Third, the Zoomshock
is moving workers away from neighbourhoods with a large supply of locally
consumed services to neighbourhoods where the supply of these services is
relatively scarce. As LCS are, by definition, geographically immobile in the
short-run, this suggests a possible geographic mismatch of supply and demand
that may have consequences for aggregate LCS employment. We found that
the scale of the losses depends crucially on the shape of the distribution of
Zoomshocks, and in particular that what matters is the skewness of positive
shocks. If the positive shocks are approximately uniformly distributed, then
losses due to frictions, such as capacity constraints, will be lower than if the
Zoomshock is concentrated on a small number of neighbourhoods. This makes
it crucial to obtain a precise measure of the Zoomshock at a highly granular
level.
An objective of this exercise is to produce guidance for policy makers in
the UK, and in other countries, in the formulation of a Covid-19 economic re-
covery strategy. The exact nature of the policy prescription depends on how
long-lived will be the increase in working-from-home. If we expect that once
the UK emerges from the current public health crisis, workers will return to the
office and pre-Covid-19 economic activities are restored, then there is a role for
policy to aid local service businesses that are currently struggling to survive. In
this case aid should focus in neighbourhoods which are experiencing the largest
negative Zoomshocks. If, on the other hand, we expect a significant fraction of
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work to continue to take place at home once public health restrictions are eased,
then policy should encourage and facilitate LCS businesses relocating to where
is the demand. That is, businesses in LCS industries should be encouraged to
move from neighbourhoods experiencing large negative Zoomshocks to neigh-
bourhoods with positive Zoomshocks. Further understanding of the impact
of the Zoomshock on economic activity will also be needed in view of the fact
that the different characteristics of the zones experiencing positive and negative
Zoomshocks will affect their ability to support LCS businesses: for example a
large café thriving in a busy city centre may not survive in a well-to-do sparsely
populated rural environment.
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